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Abstract—Recently, the field of adversarial machine learning
has been garnering attention by showing that state-of-the-art
deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples,
stemming from small perturbations being added to the input im-
age. Adversarial examples are generated by a malicious adversary
by obtaining access to the model parameters, such as gradient
information, to alter the input or by attacking a substitute model
and transferring those malicious examples over to attack the
victim model. Specifically, one of these attack algorithms, Robust
Physical Perturbations (RP2), generates adversarial images of
stop signs with black and white stickers to achieve high targeted
misclassification rates against standard-architecture traffic sign
classifiers. In this paper, we propose BlurNet, a defense against
the RP2 attack. First, we motivate the defense with a frequency
analysis of the first layer feature maps of the network on the LISA
dataset, which shows that high frequency noise is introduced
into the input image by the RP2 algorithm. To remove the
high frequency noise, we introduce a depthwise convolution layer
of standard blur kernels after the first layer. We perform a
blackbox transfer attack to show that low-pass filtering the
feature maps is more beneficial than filtering the input. We then
present various regularization schemes to incorporate this low-
pass filtering behavior into the training regime of the network
and perform white-box attacks. We conclude with an adaptive
attack evaluation to show that the success rate of the attack drops
from 90% to 20% with total variation regularization, one of the
proposed defenses.
Index Terms—Adversarial Robustness, Adversarial Defense
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has been ubiquitous in various fields like
computer vision and speech recognition. [13], [15] However,
despite these advancements, neural network classifiers have
been found to be susceptible to so called adversarial images
[28]. These images are created by altering some pixels in the
input space so that a human cannot distinguish it from a natural
image but a deep neural network will misclassify the input
[12]. This obviously has severe implications considering the
rise of self-driving cars and computer vision systems being
installed in industrial applications.
To this end, we are interested in exploring a defense to the
attack proposed in Robust Physical-World Attacks [11]. In that
work, the authors designed a general attack algorithm, Robust
Physical Perturbations (RP2) to generate visual adversarial
perturbations which are supposed to mimic real-world obstacles
to object classification. They sample physical stop signs from
varying distances and angles and use a mask to project a
computed perturbation onto these images. On a standard
classifier for road signs, their attack is 100% successful in
misclassifying stop signs.
Many defenses use spatial smoothing [17], [18], [32] as
means to stamp out the perturbation caused by adversarial
attacks. Unfortunately this approach is not always effective
if the perturbation is in the form of a piece of tape on a
stop sign. To verify this, we plot the Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT) spectrum of a vanilla and perturbed stop sign in Figure
1. Qualitatively, there does not seem to be any significant
difference between the two spectra making filtering the input
a questionable defense.
In this paper, we explore introducing low-pass filtering to
the feature maps in the first layer of the network. The main
idea is to curb the spikes in the feature map caused by the
perturbations by convolving them with a standard blur kernel
or via regularization. This will squash the spikes at the expense
of attenuating the signal at the output layer. We begin by giving
an overview of the RP2 algorithm and some background on
machine learning security. In section 3, we discuss details of
adding a filtering layer to dampen high frequency perturbations
and perform a blackbox evaluation of RP2 compared with
input filtering. In section 4, we propose various regularization
schemes for the network to learn the optimal parameters to
incorporate the low-pass filtering behavior: using the L∞ norm,
total variation minimization [25], and Tikhonov regularization
using smoothing regularization operators [24]. We then perform
a white-box evaluation with RP2 and find that the best
performing algorithms are total variation regularization and
Tikhonov regularization, which reduce the attack success rate
from 90% to 17.5% and 10% respectively compared to the
baseline classifier. In section 5, we test the upper bounds of each
of the defense methods proposed with a specialized adaptive
attack for each defense. We observed that the robustness for
the Tikhonov regularization dropped by 30% and that the total
variation regularization is the truly robust solution with the
attack success rate capped at 20%.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Problem definition
Consider a neural network to be a function F (x) = y,
such that F : Rm → Rn, where x is the input image and
m = h ∗ w ∗ c such that h,w, c are the image height, image
width, and channel number and n is a class probability vector
of length of number of classes denoting the class of the image.
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Fig. 1. The frequency spectrum of an unperturbed and perturbed stop sign
with a sticker attack. The spectrum has been log-shifted and normalized.
Frequencies close to the center correspond to lower frequencies and those that
are near the edges correspond to higher ones. Observing the spectrum of the
stop sign does not give a clear indication where the perturbations from the
stickers lie. Yellow corresponds to regions with most information content.
The goal of an attack algorithm is to generate an image, xadv ,
so the classifier output mislabels the input image in this manner,
F (xadv) 6= y. The attack success rate is defined as the number
of predictions altered by an attack, that is, 1N
∑N
n=1 1[F (xn) 6=
F (xnadv)]. Another metric to characterize the attacker’s success
is the dissimilarity distance between natural and adversarial
images,
1
N
N∑
n=1
||x− xadv||p
||x||p .
where p can take different values depending on the norm
chosen; we restrict ourselves to the L2 case. An adversarial
attack is considered strong if the attack success rate is high
while having a low dissimilarity distance.
B. Robust Physical Perturbations Attack
We provide a description of the threat model that was
considered when developing our defense. This algorithm is
restricted to the domain of road sign classification, focused
on finding effective physical perturbations that are agnostic to
unconstrained environmental conditions such as distance and
the viewing angle of the sign. This is called the Robust Physical
Perturbation Attack, known as RP2. RP2 is formulated as a
single-image optimization problem which seeks to find the
optimal perturbation δ to add to an image x, such that the
perturbed input x′ = x+ δ causes the target classifier, fθ(·) to
incur a misclassification: minH(x+ δ, x), s.t.fθ(x+ δ) = y∗
where H is a chosen distance function and y∗ is the target
class.
To solve the above constrained optimization problem, it
must be reformulated in Lagrangian-relaxed form [5]. This
threat model differs from all the others [5], [12], [16] in
that the noise introduced must be concentrated on a specific
region of image. In the context of road sign classification, an
attacker cannot alter the background of the scene so is therefore
constrained to the sign itself. To mimic this effect, a binary
mask, Mx, is multiplied with the perturbation, δ, to concentrate
the perturbation onto the sign. Since the perturbation is printed
in the real world, we need to account for fabrication error,
which ensures that the perturbation produced is a valid color
in the physical world. This is quantified by the non-printability
score(NPS), defined by Sharif et al. [26] given by:
NPS =
∑
pˆ∈R(δ)
∏
p′∈P
|pˆ− p′|,
where P is a set of printable colors and R(δ) is the set of
RGB triples used in the perturbation.
The final formulation of the optimization of the perturbation
is presented as follows:
argmin
δ
λ‖Mx · δ‖p +NPS+
J(fθ(xi + Ti(Mx · δ)), y∗). (1)
Here, Ti is an alignment function for the masked perturbation
that is used to account for if the image, xi, was transformed
so it can be placed optimally; J is the cross-entropy loss of
the classifier. For the distance metric in || · ||, both the L1 and
L2 norms can be considered. More details on the algorithm
can be obtain from [11].
C. Transferability and Adaptive Attacks
Another aspect of these adversarial attack algorithms is the
transferability property. The idea behind transferability is that
adversarial examples that are generated from a model where all
the parameters are known, can be transferred over to another
model that is not known to the attacker. It has been shown
these transferability attacks can be performed between different
classes of classifiers such as deep neural networks(DNNs),
SVMs, nearest neighbors, etc. [21] The motivation for black box
attack models arises from this property wherein the adversary is
aware of the defense being deployed but does not have access
to any of the network parameters or the exact training data
[6]. This is the most difficult threat setting for the adversary
to operate under as opposed to a white-box setting, in which
all the information about the model parameters are known.
According to Athalye et al. [2], [4], in order to evaluate any
defense that lacks provable guarantees, it is necessary to modify
the attack algorithm so that the defense’s effectiveness is tested
against new attacks under the specified threat model. This
can be done by modifying the attacker’s loss function. In this
paper, for every new defense method we explore, we attempt
an adaptive attack to capture the true robustness of the defense.
D. Dataset and Model
We adopt the setup from [11] by examining the LISA dataset
[1] and a standard 4 layer DNN classifier in the Cleverhans
framework [20]. LISA is a standard U.S traffic sign dataset
containing 47 various signs, but since there exists a large class
imbalance, we only consider the top 18 classes, just as [11].
The network architecture is comprised of 3 convolution layers
and a fully-connected layer. We train all the classifiers for 2000
epochs with the ADAM optimizer with β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999,
and  = 10−8. We evaluate our defense based on a sample set
of 40 stop sign images provided by [11] in their github repo.
Fig. 2. The FFT Spectrum of a subsampling of feature maps from the first
layer of the network. Each row corresponds to one unique feature map. The
first column is the spectrum of feature maps of an unperturbed stop sign.
The second column corresponds to the spectrum of feature maps of a stop
sign with the sticker attached. The third column is a difference between the
unperturbed and perturbed spectrum. Finally, the fourth column is a blurred
version of the difference spectrum. Values were normalized.
III. MOTIVATION
We begin by analyzing the effects of adding a sticker via
the RP2 algorithm via observations of the feature maps of
the classifier. Understanding differences in activations in both
natural and adversarial examples can inform the design of an
appropriate defense strategy. When we visualize the feature
maps, we can observe an unwanted spike from the activation
maps from the first layer in the spatial location where the mask
is inserted over the sign. These spikes are large enough that
as the activations propagate through the network they cause
the classifier to misclassify the input [12], [33]. Based on the
assumptions of the threat model, the perturbation is constrained
to be on the stop sign, which suggests that the neighboring
values around the region of the perturbation are dissimilar
in the activation map. In general, we would normally expect
smooth transitions in the activation map of images; that is,
neighbor activations within some spatial window should have
approximately similar values. As a motivating example, we
applied a standard 5x5 low-pass blur kernel over each of the
feature maps. As a result of applying the filter the impact of
the spike was substantially smaller.
This initial analysis motivates us to propose a defense that
applies a set of low-pass filters to the output of first layer of
the network. For isolated spikes that are caused by adversarial
perturbations, low-pass filters are a natural fit for smoothing out
unexpected spatial transitions in the activation maps. We focus
exclusively on the feature maps after the first layer since spatial
locality of the perturbation is still preserved. We insert these
filters by performing a depthwise convolution on the feature
maps to ensure that the filters are applied independently to
each channel [7].
To evaluate the efficacy of inserting the depthwise convolu-
tion layer, we transform the feature maps into the frequency
domain by computing the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of the
natural image, adversarial image, and their respective blurred
images, as shown in Figure 2. The spectrum is on a log-
scale and shifted so points close to the center correspond
to lower frequencies and points near the edges to higher
frequencies. Based on Figure 2, most of the high frequency
artifacts introduced from the perturbations were removed. We
do observe some low-frequency components that were induced
by the attack, but the influence from these, compared to the
high frequency spikes, is much lower.
TABLE I
RESULTS FROM BLACK BOX EVALUATION
Accuracy Attack Success Rate
Baseline 100% 90%
Input filter 3x3 100% 87.5%
Input filter 5x5 100% 67.5%
3x3 filter on L1 maps 100% 65%
5x5 filter on L1 maps 87.5% 17.5%
A. Filtering the Input vs. Filtering the feature map
A natural question to ask is what is the motivation for
filtering the feature maps over applying the blur kernel over the
input image. Our hypothesis is that filtering at the input layer
does not remove the perturbation at similar window sizes as
filtering the feature maps. To test this hypothesis, we perform
a black box transferability attack by generating adversarial
examples on the vanilla network and transferring them over
to the same model with a blurring filter at the input and one
on the feature maps. For our transfer attack, we evaluate the
accuracy on a subset of the unperturbed natural stop signs and
then measure the attack success rate on the perturbed stop
signs with λ = 0.002 and ran for 300 epochs. Our results are
shown in Table I. As seen in Table I, for lower kernel sizes,
while blurring the input does not have much of an impact
on the accuracy, it is not effective in alleviating the noise
introduced by RP2. Compared to blurring the input, adding
the blur kernels to the features generated by the first layer
seems to effectively reduce the attack success rate at some
cost in accuracy. This result motivates an attempt to alter the
training regime so it learns the gain parameters in the filter
implicitly, rather than setting them to predefined known values,
so that robustness can be maintained at a minimal accuracy
loss.
B. Evaluating under a different threat model
Before proceeding onto the white box evaluation that
we present in Section IV, we are interested in seeing the
performance of the defenses under the standard -bound pixel-
based adversaries. We choose the traditional PGD attack [19]
as our adversary, with  = 8.0/255, step size, α = 0.01 and 10
steps. The results are reported in Table IV in the Supplementary
Material. Unsuprisingly, all the defenses are broken under the
assumption that the adversary can manipulate any arbitrary
pixel since our defenses rely on the perturbation being localized
on the subject and that neighboring features should be similar
to each other. This finding suggests that there does not exist one
broad defense to all attacks but rather suggests that defenses
should be tailored to defend a restricted class of attacks instead.
IV. LEARNING THE FILTER PARAMETERS
From the previous section, we see that filtering the feature
maps is an effective scheme at discarding the perturbations
introduced from RP2. However, the side effect of naively
inserting a layer of low-pass filters is that the confidence of
the prediction is reduced. In certain application domains such
as autonomous vehicles, low confidence predictions from the
classifier may not be acceptable. For correcting the reduction
in the confidence, we seek to incorporate an additional loss
term into the training of the classifier. We explore several
different options for loss terms: L∞ norm on the weights of
the depthwise layer (added filter layer), total variance(TV)
minimization applied to the feature map (no added layer) [25],
and Tikhonov regularization [24].
A. Depthwise Convolution Layer
To emulate the effect of adding a layer of low pass filters,
the L∞ norm is an apt choice for the depthwise weights. This
will ensure that the weights in the kernel take similar values
to act much like a low pass filter. The resulting loss that is
minimized, where K is the number of channels in the input, is:
min α
K∑
j=1
‖Wdepthwise[:, :, j]‖∞ + J(fθ(x, y)). (2)
In our white-box evaluation, we explore the effect of filter
width on the effectiveness of the attack algorithm.
B. Total Variation Loss Term
We introduce the TV loss term into the optimization
algorithm for the classifier, without adding an additional
depthwise convolution to the network. Total variation of the
image measures the pixel-level deviations for the nearest
neighbor and minimizes the absolute difference between those
neighbors. For a given image, the TV of an input image x is
given as:
TV (x) =
∑
i,j
|xi+1,j − xi,j |+ |xi,j+1 − xi,j |. (3)
We omit the depthwise convolution layer from the network and
instead let the first layer of the network learn to filter out the
high-frequency spikes in its feature map. Defining F as the
set of feature maps after the first layer, the final optimization
objective is given as:
min αTV
1
N ·K
N∑
i=1
K∑
i=1
TV (F [i, :, :, k]) + J(fθ(x, y)), (4)
where N and K are the batch size and the number of output
channels, respectively. Intuitively, TV removes effects of details
that have high gradients in the image, effectively targeting the
perturbations introduced by RP2 for denoising. TV encourages
the neighboring values in the feature maps to be similar so the
high spike introduced by RP2 would be diminished.
C. Tikhonov Regularization
In our last method, we propose two variants based off of
Generalized Tikhonov Regularization. The general form for
Tikhonov is given usually given as
min µ||L · w0||2 + J(fθ(x, y, w0)), (5)
where w0 is some parameter of the model, µ is the regulariza-
tion parameter, and L is the regularization operator [24] and
is the identity matrix in the L2 regularization case. Similar to
the TV loss terms, we attempt to induce low-pass filtering by
applying regularization to the first layer feature maps. We do
this by selecting a regularization operator L which penalizes
high frequency components in the feature maps. The two
operators are as follows:
• The operator Lhf = (I − Lavg), where Lavg is a matrix
which transforms the input into its moving average and
consequently, Lhf extracts the high frequency components
and gets minimized.
• The operator L+diff , where Ldiff is a difference matrix
which approximates a derivative operation. When the
difference matrix approximates a derivative operation, its
pseudoinverse approximates an integral operation and is
thus a low pass filter [24]. These are known as smoothing
operators. We compute this pseudoinverse and perform
an elementwise multiplication to apply it to the feature
maps.
Borrowing notation from above, the actual objectives being
minimized are given as:
min αhf
1
N ·K
N∑
i=1
K∑
i=1
||Lhf · F [i, :, :, k]||2
+ J(fθ(x, y)) (6)
min αpseudo
1
N ·K
N∑
i=1
K∑
i=1
||L+diff · F [i, :, :, k]||2
+ J(fθ(x, y)) (7)
Both of these will be referred to as Tikhf and Tikpseudo
respectively. Similar to the other defenses, this regularization
scheme should enforce the property that lower frequency
representations should be more emphasized in the feature maps.
To reiterate, there are no changes to the model architecture;
the defense is coming from the first layer weights.
D. White-Box Evaluation
We perform a white-box evaluation and sweep the hyperpa-
rameters in the attack algorithm, λ and the attack target, y∗.
Our results are reported in Table II. In the white-box setting,
the attacker has access to all the model parameters as well as
the classification output. The main goal of the evaluation is to
detect if the attack algorithm is able to introduce perturbations
with the knowledge of the model parameters. The legitimate
accuracy corresponds to the accuracy on the test set. We ran
the attack algorithm for 300 epochs. When we sweep the
parameters, we find that the attack target is the parameter
most sensitive to increasing the success rate of the attack and
is relatively invariant to λ. Certain attack targets are more
amenable to attacks because there may be steeper gradients
of the loss function with respect to those target labels. The
TABLE II
RESULTS FROM WHITE BOX EVALUATION
α Legitimate Acc. Average Success Rate Worst Success Rate L2 Dissimilarity
Baseline 0 91% 49.18% 90% 0.207
Gaussian aug (σ = 0.1) - 84.3% 19.44% 62.5% 0.238
Gaussian aug (σ = 0.2) - 84.4% 55.97% 80% 0.196
Gaussian aug (σ = 0.3) - 85.6% 21.39% 25% 0.198
Rand. sm (σ = 0.1) - 84.3% 19.3% 67.5% 0.236
Rand. sm (σ = 0.2) - 84.4% 55% 70% 0.189
Rand. sm (σ = 0.3) - 85.6% 22.5% 22.5% 0.198
Adv-train - 77.9% 11.94% 20% 0.244
3x3 conv 10−5 86.3% 30% 55% 0.201
5x5 conv 0.1 86.3% 24.11% 47.5% 0.189
7x7 conv 0.1 87% 11.61% 30% 0.203
TV 10−4 85.6% 7.92% 17.5% 0.224
TV 10−5 82.3% 8.47% 30% 0.199
Tikhf 10−4 84.5% 5.416% 10% 0.214
Tikpseudo 10−6 83.6% 13.9% 35% 0.222
legitimate accuracy refers to the accuracy on the test set and the
average success rate is the attack success rate averaged across
all other 17 classes (excluding the true label). We also report
the best case scenario for the attacker and the L2 dissimilarity
distance.
We use Randomized Smoothing [3] as a baseline to compare
our low-pass filtering methods. In their paper, Cohen et. al [8]
leverage the classifier trained with Gaussian-augmented noise
to obtain a new smoothened classifier which gives provable
guarantees on the accuracy of the classifier. Intuitively, it can
be interpreted that this augmentation is acting like a smoothing
operation by drowning the adversarial perturbations, making it
an appropriate method for baseline comparison. We took 100
MC samples when evaluating the forward prediction on the
augmented images. We also use standard PGD-Adversarial
training as a baseline comparison with an L∞ adversary
with  = 8/255 and step size, α = 0.1 with 7 steps of
gradient descent [19]. For each epoch, we train on 50% on
clean examples and the other half on Adversarial examples.
One potential explanation to why these traditional pixel-based
defenses do not perform as well is that they were developed
under a different threat model and were not designed to defend
against this type of attack, which further supports the point no
universal defense exists against all attacks.
We find that the Tikhf and TV minimization loss term
has superior performance compared to all the other methods,
bringing the attack success rate down to 10% and 17.5%
respectively. Tikhf is able to directly minimize high frequency
components which is why the success rate is lower than the
success rate for total variation regularization. TV is effectively
encouraging the first convolutional weight to not only act as
a feature extractor but also to stifle high variations coming
from the input. For the depthwise convolution layer with the
L∞ norm regularizer, as the width of the filter increases, the
network is able to attenuate the attack success rate because a
large window from the surrounding neighbors will be able to
smooth out the perturbation. However, the TV loss is better
than applying the L∞ as it is directly able to influence the
weights to behave like a low-pass filter rather than indirectly
through the L∞ norm. The Tikpseudo model has comparable
performance to the 7x7 depthwise convolution. A plausible
reason why Tikpseudo performs slightly worse is because it
is an approximation of a low-pass filter, rather than the other
methods which take a more direct approach against the high
frequency components in the feature maps.
V. ADAPTIVE ATTACKS
After presenting the whitebox evaluation, we perform
adaptive attacks for each of the defenses proposed to obtain an
upper bound on the attack success rate. We do this by changing
the loss function of the attacker to reflect what training or
architectural changes we made to make the model more robust.
We make sure to follow guidelines outlined in [29] to show
that we properly evaluate our defenses.
A. Low Frequency Attack on Depthwise Convolution
We begin by trying to introduce low-frequency perturbations
by restricting the δ parameter to a low-frequency region with
a mask, Mdim. We follow Yash et al. [27] by applying the
Direct Cosine Transform (DCT) to the masked perturbation,
argmin
δ
λ‖Mx · δ‖p + J(fθ(xi+
Ti(IDCT (Mdim ·DCT (Mx · δ)))), y∗). (8)
where the default dimension selected was 16. The results from
the low frequency attack is report in Table III. We observe
that the adaptive attack on the 3x3 kernel did not significantly
change, although the robustness of the 3x3 kernel was not as
effective. The 5x5 kernel’s performance was greatly diminished
such that the worst case attack success rate jumped from 47.5%
to 75%.
In the 7x7 case, the attack did not produce an upper bound
on the attack success rate. This could be due to the fact that
the mask used was not restrictive enough for the 7x7 adaptive
to succeed. In Figure 3, we vary the dimension of Mdim to
try to increase the effectiveness of the attack. We observe that
when Mdim is size 8x8, the attack success rate increases to
35% showing that the adaptive attack is effective but not by
TABLE III
RESULTS FROM ADAPTIVE ATTACK EVALUATION
Average Success Rate Worst Success Rate L2 Dissimilarity
3x3 conv 22.91% 52.5% 0.546
5x5 conv 46.25% 75% 0.539
7x7 conv 10.416% 20% 0.539
TV (10−4) 8.33% 20% 0.044
TV (10−5) 6.11% 25% 0.046
Tikhf 23.6% 47.5% 0.147
Tikpseudo 17.5% 45% 0.141
a large margin showing that using Linf regularized depthwise
convolution is effective even against dynamic adversaries under
the RP2 threat model. When we observe the difference in the
images between the white-box and adaptive attacks, we see that
in the adaptive Adversarial examples the pixels in the sticker
region tend to resemble values closer to their neighboring
values.
B. Attack on Total Variation, Tikhonov Regularized Models
For our adaptive attacks on our regularized models, we adapt
the loss function of the attack to include details on how the
model was trained. Specifically, we add the regularizer that
the model was trained with to the attacker’s loss function. We
execute this attack on TV-regularized models, Tikhf model and
the Tikpseudo model which are shown below. We abbreviate the
previous loss terms in the attack objective as ladv for brevity.
argmin
δ
ladv +
1
N ·K
N∑
i=1
K∑
i=1
TV (F [i, :, :, k]), (9)
argmin
δ
ladv +
1
N ·K
N∑
i=1
K∑
i=1
||Lhf · F [i, :, :, k]||2, (10)
argmin
δ
ladv +
1
N ·K
N∑
i=1
K∑
i=1
||L+diff · F [i, :, :, k]||2. (11)
We note the results of our adaptive attack in Table III. We
experimented with adding a regularization parameter to the
additional term in the attack objective, but we found that this
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Fig. 3. The impact of the DCT mask dimension on the adaptive attack success
rate for 7x7 depthwise convolution.
reduced the performance of the attack so we omitted these
results. From the white-box evaluation, it seemed that the most
robust model was Tikhf ; however, upon conducting the adaptive
attack, we can see the robustness for Tikhf drop by nearly
30% whereas TV (10−4) suffered only a 2.5% performance
degradation. Tikpseudo’s worst case success rate was 10% over
the white-box evaluation. Clearly, the truly robust model is TV,
maintaining low attack success rate even against a dynamic
adversary. Under the RP2 threat model, this result shows
that performing filtering operations on the feature maps gains
significant robustness with minimal accuracy loss.
One of the possible reasons why Tikhonov regularization
did not produce robust models could be due to the choice of
the regularization operators. In the case of Tikhf , increasing
the effective averaging window of the operator Lavg would be
more aggressive in filtering, potentially at the cost of accuracy.
For Tikpseudo, [24] discusses using a weighted pseudoinverse
with the input (feature maps) may be a better approximation
of a low pass filter. Intuitively, a superior approximation of the
filter would be calculated with knowledge of the input rather
than only a fixed regularization operator.
VI. CONCLUSION
We performed spectral analysis of feature maps and saw
that attacks introduce high-frequency components, which are
amenable to low-pass filtering. Our proposal introduced a
simple solution of adding low-pass filters after the first layer of
the DNN. We compare with this with blurring the input image
and show that blurring at the feature level can confer some
robustness benefit at the cost of some accuracy by performing
a black-box transferability attack with RP2. To compensate for
the loss in accuracy, we explore various regularization schemes:
adding a depthwise convolution, total variation minimization,
and Tikhonov regularization and show that we can recover
the loss in accuracy while retaining significant robustness
benefit under a white-box evaluation. Against the RP2 attack,
we showed that our defense can perform better than more
traditional defenses against norm-bound adversaries such as
[8], [19]. We empirically show the upper bounds of these
methods by performing an adaptive attack on the defense. In
the future, we hope to explore if BlurNet would still be robust
against different kinds of physically realizable attacks.
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VII. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A. Inserting filters in higher layers
We choose only to look at the feature maps after the output
of the first layer. We explored adding filters into higher layers of
the neural network and we find that these reduce classification
accuracy. We hypothesize the reason for this accuracy loss is
that the higher layers in the network naturally contain high
frequency information. We verify this hypothesis by computing
the Fast Fourier transform of the activations maps of the higher
level convolutional layers given in Figure 4. From Figure 4, we
can see that the magnitude spectrum shows that the difference
between higher and lower frequencies is not pronounced. If a
low pass filter is introduced at this level in the network, too
much information is lost for the DNN to make a meaningful
prediction. In order to maintain classification accuracy, high
frequencies in the feature maps should not be squashed. Adding
a set of filters to the higher levels of the network is also difficult
to justify from a semantic perspective, since the spatial locality
of the features is not preserved, as the the receptive field of
the neurons in upper layers is wider and even discontinuous
due to non-unit convolution strides and/or max-pooling layers.
B. Plots of the ASR vs. L2 dissimilarity over all targets
In Figure 5 and 6, we plot the L2 dissimilarity distance
against the attack success rate to show the variation of each
defense methods across the target labels. We find that TV and
Tikhonov loss terms have less variation than the other depthwise
convolution layers. TV and Tikhf proposed outperformed the
Gaussian baseline both in terms of both average and worst
case success rate and L2 dissimilarity distance. 7x7 depthwise
convolution and Tikpseudo were only outshown by 5% by the
best Gaussian augmented model (σ = 0.3) for the worse case
attack success rate while having better average attack success
rates and L2 dissimilarity distance. Empirically, these results
show performing smoothing and filtering operations on the
feature maps rather than the input is more effective.
Fig. 4. The FFT Spectrum of a subsampling of feature maps from the second
layer of the network. These feature maps were obtained from a normal stop
sign. The high values indicated at the edges of the spectrum suggests that
higher frequency information is relevant to maintain decent classification.
C. Comparing Adversarial Training To Adaptive Attacks
In Table V, we compare adversarial training against the TV
adaptive, Tikhf and Tikpseudo attacks. Adversarial training is
able to outperform all the defenses we proposed besides the
TV-regularized defence. This evaluation shows that there is an
advantage using total variation regularization in the case of the
RP2 attack over adversarial training, further reinforcing the
point that no universal defense exists for all threat models. We
would also like to emphasize that performing adaptive attacks
steps outside the RP2 threat model in that manipulating input
pixels falls outside the domain of stickers on a subject.
D. Related Work
Many kinds of defenses have been proposed in the machine
learning security literature. There seems to have been two kinds
of approaches to developing defenses: robust classification and
detection. Robust classification refers to the classifier being able
to correctly classify the input despite the perturbation whereas
detection refers to a scheme of identifying if an example has
been tampered with and rejecting it from the classifier. Recently,
detection methods have seen much more popularity than robust
classification (our method belongs to the latter class). However,
in certain domains such as autonomous vehicles, it is not always
feasible to reject the input from classifier.
1) Adversarial training: Adversarial training is the tech-
nique of injecting adversarial examples and the corresponding
gold standard labels into the training set [12], [19], [28]. The
motivation of this methodology is that the network will learn
the adversarial perturbations introduced by the attacker. The
problem with adversarial training is that it doubles the training
time of the classifier as new examples need to be generated.
Moreover, as shown by Papernot et al., adversarial training
needs all types of adversarial examples produced by all known
attacks, as the training process is non-adaptive [23]. Our method
can be paired with any of these types of defenses. In their paper,
Xie et al. [31] used feature denoising along with adversarial
training to boost the performance of the network. While the
spirit of the prior work is similar, some differences between
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for Tikhonov-regularized models and Gaussian augmentation. Lower and to
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this method and ours is that in our defense was designed under
a different threat model in which we are focused on removing
high frequency components in the first level feature maps. We
enforce this behavior explicitly by including it in the training
process whereas in the prior work it was embedded into the
model as an architectural element. Since this method is paired
with adversarial training, it is unclear on what robustness of the
denoising operation is providing by itself, making it difficult to
compare to our method which does not involve any adversarial
training.
2) Input transformations: Most previous work has applied
some type of transform to the input image. In their paper, Guo
et al. use total variance minimization and image quilting to
transform the input image. They use random pixel dropout
and reconstruct the image with the removed perturbation [14].
Dziugaite et al. examined the effects of JPEG compression
on adversarial images generated from the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [10], [12]. They report that for perturbations
of small magnitude JPEG compression is able to recover some
of the loss in classification accuracy, but not always. Xu et
al. introduce feature squeezing, a detection method based on
reducing the color bit of each pixel in the input and spatially
smoothing the input with a median filter [32]. In their paper,
Li et al. propose detecting adversarial examples by examining
statistics from the convolutional layers and building a cascade
TABLE IV
PGD RESULTS EVALUATION
Attack Success Rate L2 Dissimilarity
Baseline 100% 0.53
3x3 conv 100% 0.512
5x5 conv 100% 0.502
7x7 conv 100% 0.511
TV (10−4) 100% 0.455
TV (10−5) 100% 0.437
Tikhf 100% 0.464
Tikpseudo 100% 0.443
TABLE V
EVALUATING ADVERSARIAL TRAINING AGAINST ADAPTIVE ADVERSARIES
Average Success Rate Worst Success Rate L2 Dissimilarity
TV adaptive attack 5.85% 27.5% 0.046
Tikhf attack 17.6% 18% 0.148
Tikpseudo attack 15% 17.5% 0.150
classifier. They discover that they are able to recover some of
the rejected samples by applying an average filter [17]. Liang
et al. looked at using image processing techniques such as
scalar quantization and a smoothing spatial filter to dampen the
perturbations introduced. The authors introduce a metric, which
they define as image entropy, to use different types of filters
to smooth the input [18]. We stress that the key difference
between these approaches and the proposed methods is that we
focus on applying these smoothing techniques through model
changes and regularization on the feature maps rather than the
input.
3) Other Defenses: Gradient masking refers to the phe-
nomenon of the gradients being hidden from the adversary
by reducing model sensitivity to small changes applied to
the input [22]. These can be due to operations that are
added to the network that are not differentiable so regular
gradient based attacks are insufficient. Another class of gradient
masking includes introducing randomization into the network.
Stochastic Activation Pruning essentially performs dropout
at each layer where nodes are dropped according to some
weighted distribution [9]. Xie et al. propose a randomization in
which the defense randomly rescales and randomly zero-pads
the input to an appropriate shape to feed to the classifier [30].
However, as Athalye et al. have shown in their paper, gradient
masking is not an effective defense since the adversary can
apply the Backward Pass Differential Approximation attack, in
which the attacker approximates derivatives by computing the
forward path and backward path with an approximation of the
function. Even against randomization, the authors introduce
another attack, Expectation over Transformation (EOT), where
the optimization algorithm minimizes the expectation of the
transformation applied to the input [2].
